The al-Qa'ida attacks of 11 September 2001 and the delivery of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) via the US Postal Service triggered a significant increase in initiatives to improve defense against biological attacks. They also reinvigorated a decades-old debate about the contributions that openly published scientific research might make to the efforts of bioterrorists and others who may be developing a biological warfare (BW) or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability. Resolution of this debate could be made easier by input from knowledgeable intelligence and other national security professionals. Collaboration involving the national security and bioscience research communities could be key to minimizing the challenges posed by proliferation of research findings that have bioterror and BW applications.
Unfortunately, while there have been recent discussions involving these communities, the relationship between them has been nearly nonexistent. Accordingly, initial approaches and interactions must be planned and carefully carried out to ensure that the bridges built between the two communities are solid and long lasting. A necessary first step is to make sure that national security professionals who enter this collaboration are thoroughly familiar with the current and past debates among scientists about the potential openly published research findings have to enable BW or bioterrorism. This article is an overview of this debate, and it summarizes the most recent discussions among bioscience researchers. In addition, it offers some options the Intelligence Community (IC) can consider to help the life science community continue its work effectively, while safeguarding national security. 1
Early Discussions of National Security and Science
Since the 1940s the US national security community has worked with scientific organizations and research communities to develop a policy for identifying areas of basic and applied research requiring control of information. Such research, historically related either to weapons development or sensitive nuclear technologies, has been designated as classified and is subject Control of information concerning research into nuclear power has also been instituted. Private industry was permitted to explore limited applications of nuclear power under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Before then, the federal government protected nuclear energy activities with security and secrecy programs. The Atomic Energy Act prohibited dissemination of nuclear research information from its creation regardless of who controls it. • Activities and findings in which the benefits of total openness overshadow their possible nearterm military benefits to the Soviet Union.
• Areas of research for which classification is clearly indicated.
• A small "gray" area that lies between the first two and for Furthermore, the panel provided guidelines to assist the federal government in categorizing research activities.
According to the panel, "no restriction of any kind limiting access or communication should be applied to any area of university research, be it basic or applied, unless it involves a technology meeting all the following criteria:"
• The technology is developing rapidly and the time from basic science to application is short;
• The technology has identifiable direct military applications, or it is dual-use and involves process-or production-related techniques;
• Transfer of the technology would give the USSR a significant near-term military benefit;
• The US is the only source of information about the technology, or other friendly nations that could also be a source have control systems.
The panel suggested that in dealing with gray technologies and federally-funded research, the government could achieve sufficient security by restricting the access of foreign students and researchers to the laboratory undertaking the research and stipulating a policy of federal review of research manuscripts and other products before their publication or open dissemina- In the post-9/11 environment, the openness of the life science research community is again a subject of discussion.
possibly because so few were concerned about the issue.
Ultimately, although the Asilomar Conference, NAS panel, and later, but infrequent, discussions into the 1990s provided helpful insights, the efficacy of their proposed resolutions must be considered in a broader political and historical context. In general, the recommendations and findings of these groups have largely been superseded by the fall of the Soviet Union, the emergence of international terrorism, and the advancement of science. findings of the 1982 panel would be prudent.
Resurrection of the Life Science/Security Debate
In the post-9/11 and post-anthrax attack environment of heightened security awareness the public, legislators, and government leaders have increased their scrutiny of potential sources of support for terrorists. The openness of the life science research community is again a subject of discussion. For example, in an effort to curb the flow of potentially valuable information to bioterrorists, the DOD drafted a report "Mandatory Procedures for Research and Technology Protection within the DOD," which outlined plans to provide DOD program managers greater oversight of whether DOD-funded laboratories could publish some of their findings. The proposal drew harsh criticism from the scientific community and was eventually discarded. 16 In addition, NIH 
Following implementation of these regulations, scientists began to express concern that some biologists with government funding were being encouraged to rein in full publication of their own work. 18 Following similar developments in the United Kingdom, some scientists became concerned that the defensive response was disproportionate to the actual threat. 19 Growing tension between some leading researchers and the federal government continued to escalate throughout the spring and summer of 2002, largely due to media reports that highlighted the dual-use potential of a number of recent scientific publications.
• Ideally, such evaluations should include insights from leading life science researchers actively engaged in "cutting edge" science, as they will have the clearest insights on the technical capabilities and limitations of biotechnologies for malevolent purposes.
Partially in response to media frenzy surrounding the Weldon resolution, on 18 October 2002, NAS outlined its recommendations for addressing the issue in its "Background Paper on Action Point 1: The scientific…community should work closely with the federal government to determine which research may be related to possible new security threats and to develop principles for researchers in each field.
Today, the chemical, biological, and even social science communities bear new responsibilities to identify materials and areas of research that should-or should not be-classified, and to provide assessments on the impact of classification on scientific, engineering, and health research.
The science, engineering, and health community can also clarify the distinction between the basic research that yields fundamental new understanding and the technological developments that are required for weapons development.
Action Point 2:
The federal government should affirm and maintain the general principle of National Security Decision Directive 189, issued in 1985.
A successful balance…demands clarity in the distinctions between classified and unclassified research.
We believe it to be essential that these distinctions not include poorly defined categories of "sensitive but unclassified" information that does not provide guidance on what kind of information should be restricted from public access.
Even classified research, within its much smaller universe, must be confirmed through the participation of a community of outstanding science, engineering, and health researchers.* reach a consensus on guidelines for scientific information that should not be published. 48 The editorial did not represent a radical departure from standing policy, but concisely stated the opinions of the editors present at the workshop. It made four points:
• First, the scientific information published in peer-reviewed journals carries special status, and confers unique responsibilities on editors and authors.
• Second, the editors recognize that the prospect of bioterrorism has raised legitimate concerns about the potential misuse of published information, but also recognize that research in the very same fields will be critical to society in meeting the challenges of defense.
• Third, scientists and their journals should consider the appropriate level and design of processes to accomplish effective review of papers that raise such security issues.
• Fourth, on occasion an editor may conclude that the potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits. 49 The response of researchers and security experts to the statement was mixed. Some researchers complained that they were not consulted. University, was quoted as saying the statement is "more equivocal and less definitive" than he would like to see. Others believe that scientists should go much further to address security concerns about life science research. David Heyman, a science and security expert at CSIS, said that the statement was "only a step" and that scientists should make changes earlier in the research process to reduce the risk of biological research being misused. 50 By far the sharpest public critic of the statement, respected microbiologist Stanley Falkow, has taken issue with the failure of its authors to elicit more discussion before its publication. Falkow faults the authors for failing "to provide guidelines regarding who exactly would make decisions about publication and what constitutes a potential contribution to the activities of bioterrorists." 51 Falkow's statement suggests that he supports the formation of a committee to provide insight and oversight regarding research of concern. However, it is his opinion that the issue should be "earnestly discussed by the broad community of scientists, together with those whose mission it is to guard national security." 52
A deeper relationship between the IC and life science communities has the potential to benefit the Intelligence Community.
of all federal departments and agencies that conduct or support life sciences research" by "recommending specific strategies for the efficient and effective oversight of federally conducted or supported potential dual-use biological research taking into consideration both national security concerns and the needs of the research community." 56 According to the NSABB Web site, the group will be charged specifically with guiding the development of guidelines for the identification and conduct of research that may require special attention and security surveillance. 57 Although NSABB members have not yet been publicly identified, the board will consist of voting and ex-officio members from the national security and intelligence communities as well as an abundance of leading life scientists. Thus, the NSABB may serve as one vehicle for consistent and productive interaction between the intelligence and life science communities. Maximum benefit of this relationship could best be realized by ensuring that intelligence and national security professionals assigned to support NSABB efforts possess a strong background in the life sciences; it will do little good for intelligence professionals who do not adequately understand the underlying principles to engage life scientists in discussions on the 56 Ibid., 1. 57 NSABB Web site: http://www. biosecurityboard.gov.
potential security implications of highly technical research findings.
Intelligence Support to the Scientific Community
The life science research community clearly would benefit from insights of the IC and other national security professionals if it is to progress beyond the current state of discussion and develop a coordinated strategy for assessing and mitigating threats enabled by research of concern. Engagement of the scientific community should be of paramount importance to biological warfare and CBRN terrorism analysts in the IC.
In addition to obvious areas in which security experts could contribute, such as providing insights and methodologies for deriving threat assessments and offering national security information to cleared life science experts, there are many less obvious opportunities for IC input. For example, the IC is well positioned to see that life science experts are educated about the activities terrorist groups and foreign states allegedly undertake to support their BW efforts. Also, IC personnel possess access to a wealth of information pertinent to the physical properties and characteristics of biothreat agents. Much of this information, at least that which is unclassified or for official use only (FOUO), would be useful to researchers struggling with the development of novel countermeasures and systems for civilian biodefense.
A deeper relationship between the IC and life science communities has the potential to benefit the IC, which has long struggled to maintain an internal core of bioscience expertise. In addition, formulation of a positive view among life science professionals about the IC could lead to an increase in the number of top graduate students and young life science researchers who seek employment in intelligence or national security agencies. Most importantly, closer and continuing contact with life science investigators could yield greater insight regarding suspicious attempts of foreign researchers to acquire from legitimate scientists information, reagents, or technology of high dual-use value. Such insights could enable further targeting of IC resources. In order to develop the potential synergy between the two communities; the national security community will need to take the first steps. Ultimately, none of the potential benefits will be realized until long after IC professionals have sown seeds of goodwill within the life science research community and engaged influential scientists as partners on BW counterproliferation initiatives.
